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The Adversary Model is Bent
by William T. Pizzi, Phillip S. Figa
and Kenneth E. Barnhill, Jr.

William T.Pizzi, Boulder, is the Associate Dean at
the University of Colorado School of Law. Phillip
S. Figa, Denver, is with the firm of Burns & Figa,
P.C. Kenneth E. Barnhill, Jr., Denver, is with the
firm of Lohf & Barnhill, P.C.

Several years ago Marvin Frankel, who new role permitted by the Model Rules-the
was then a federal judge in the Southern role of the lawyer as an "intermediary"
District of New York, wrote a controversial between two clients-is also considered.
law review article entitled "The Search of
Truth: An Umpireal View. "I In his article
THE LAWYER AS ADVOCATE
Judge Frankel argued that our adversary system rates truth too low. He suggested sev- Perjury and the Disclosure of Client
eral sweeping changes in the Code of Pro- Confidences
As initially adopted, there was confusion
fessional Responsibility ("Code") which
would change the adversary model in the in the Code over the proper role of a lawyer
pursuit of what Frankel called "the whole in the situation where the lawyer's client
takes the stand and commits perjury by telltruth."
Judge Frankel is a member of the Kutak ing a story completely at odds with what the
Commission and it would be inaccurate to client has previously told the lawyer. While
say that the proposed Model Rules of Pro- the Code requires a lawyer to protect client
fessional Conduct ("Model Rules ") simply confidences, DR 4-O1(C)(2) permits disembody the views of Judge Frankel. closure "when permitted under Disciplinary
Nonetheless, one can see throughout the Rules." DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Code reModel Rules a softening of the adversary quires a lawyer whose client has "perperole of the lawyer. In many cases lawyers trated a fraud upon . . . a tribunal" to try to
would be required, or at least urged, to dis- get the client to rectify the fraud and, if the
close voluntarily information adverse to a client refuses, to reveal the fraud to the triclient that would not be disclosed today bunal.
In 1974, the uncertainty over the lawyer's
either because such information would be
viewed as confidential or because such dis- apparently conflicting obligations to the
client and to the court was resolved when
closure would be viewed simply as being
disloyal to the client, especially when such DR 7-102(B)(1) was qualified by providing
disclosure might lead to a less favorable that a lawyer must disclose client fraud to a
tribunal "except when the information is
result for the client.
This article considers the Model Rules protected as a privileged communication."
which define the lawyer's role as an advo- Thus, DR 7-102(B)(1) as amended resolved
cate and the lawyer's role as a negotiator. A the tension between the lawyer's duty to the
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client and the lawyer's duty to the court in
favor of the client by giving precedence to
the duty to preserve confidences over the
duty to inform. 2
The Model Rules in Rule 3.1(b) reverse
the Code by requiring disclosure to the court
of false testimony "even if doing so requires
disclosure of a confidence of the client. "
The CBA Ethics Subcommittee feels
strongly that this provision as it applies to a
client's confidences should be changed. The
disclosure of client confidences even to correct client perjury would undercut the
lawyer-client relationship. While client perjury places a lawyer in a uncomfortable position, the present balance which gives precedence to the duty to preserve confidences
over the duty to inform is necessary to preserve the trust which must exist between
lawyer and client.
A lawyer must be able to assure his client
that what the client tells the lawyer is protected from disclosure by the lawyer and the
client must be able to rely upon this assurance. If the relationship were otherwise, the
lawyer's effectiveness in representing the
client would be undermined because of the
lack of truth and candor in that relationship.
(See the Symposium article entitled "The
Lawyer-Client Relationship as Autonomous" in which confidentiality is discussed in
detail.)

Of course, prosecutors have for a long
time been under both an ethical and constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense. The Code imposes
such an obligation in DR 7-103 and the
Model Rules also incorporate the same obligation in Rule 3.10(d). However, Rule
3.1(e) goes beyond dealing with the obligations of prosecutors and appears to apply to
all advocates, including those in civil cases.
The Subcommittee is troubled by this 4
provision. While the provision is written in
permissive terms, the reference to the exception for defense counsel who are "not required" to disclose such adverse evidence
makes it appear that, except for the defense
lawyer, the disclosure of evidence favorable
to another party is professionally proper and
perhaps mandatory.
Even if Rule 3.1(e) is read as being totally
permissive, the Subcommittee concludes
that this provision should be deleted. There
are no standards or guidelines controlling
the disclosure of such evidence. Some
courts or grievance committees might read
Rule 3.1(e) as requiring disclosure and thus
mandatory. This would radically change the
nature of litigation and the discovery process. In short, Rule 3.1(e) on the disclosure
of favorable evidence to another party is
viewed by the Subcommittee as. not only
unhelpful but a cause for alarm.

Disclosure of Evidence Favorable
to the Adverse Party
Another troubling aspect of Rule 3.1 is
paragraph (e) which reads as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (f), a
lawyer may apprise another party of
evidence favorable to that party. . . .
Paragraph (f) provides that a defense
lawyer in a criminal case "is not required to
apprise the prosecutor of evidence adverse
to the accused." The exact intent of Rule
3.1(e) is unclear, for the Rule is written in
terms of "may," not "shall," and it
suggests or at least implies that with the
exception of criminal defense lawyers,
litigators should disclose adverse evidence
to the other side.

The Advocate as a Witness
The Code in DR 5-101 and DR 5-102
provides that lawyers should not accept
employment or continue to represent a client
in litigation when the lawyer will or ought to
be called as a witness at the trial. There are
some exceptions to this prohibition; for
example, if the testimony of the lawyer relates to a technical or uncontested matter or
the withdrawal would work a "substantial
hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer," then the lawyer
may represent the client.
The Model Rules are substantially similar
to the current provisions of the Code with
one major exception, which could be of importance to law firms. The Code treats a

THE ADVERSARY MODEL IS BENT

1980

lawyer and a law firm the same, requiring
withdrawal if the lawyer or a member of the
firm will be an important witness. The
Model Rules, however, in Rule 3.9(b) provide that a lawyer may continue to act as an
advocate if a member of the lawyer's firm
will be a witness-unless it creates a conflict
of interest. Conflicts of interest are defined
as those circumstances in which a lawyer
has interests, commitments or responsibilities that may adversely affect the representation of a client. 3 In those instances,
representation of the client must be declined. However, conflicts of interest can be
waived upon disclosure to and consent by
the client and provided that the services of
the lawyer can be performed without violating other rules of professional conduct. (For
a full treatment of conflicts of interest, see
the Symposium article entitled "Limited
Loyalty.")
The interplay of the disqualification of a
firm when a lawyer of that firm will be a
witness on behalf of a client and the prohibition against conflicts of interest is not spelled out in the Model Rules. The Comment to
Rule 3.9 explains the rationale behind the
different treatment of the lawyer-as-awitness conflict when a firm is involved in
the following way:
The situation is usually quite different
when different lawyers in the same firm
or department are involved as advocate
and witness. If a single laywer is in-
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volved, intermixing the roles of advocate and witness is unavoidable. On the
other hand, if different lawyers are involved, the testimony of the lawyerwitness ordinarily can be presented by
an advoacte from the same office without undue confusion. The essential
problem is that of assessing the relative
significance of the burden on the client
of having to retain different counsel,
the burden on the opposing party of
confronting an advocate-witness, and
the risk of serious conflict of interest
between the firm involved and its
client.4
It is apparent here that Model Rule 3.9 tends
to favor the firm as against the sole practitioner in this conflict of interest situation.
The Subcommittee finds that the Model
Rule on vicarious disqualification in the
advocate-witness situation is incomplete.
Part of the problem facing the advocatewitness is the possible conflict of interest
should the lawyer's testimony be adverse to
the client. Also of importance is the jury
confusion that may be caused by a lawyer
testifying as a witness and arguing as an
advocate in the same case. The Model Rule,
which allows a member of a firm to be a
witness while another member of the firm is
arguing the case, speaks only to a conflict of
interes with the client. The Subcommittee
suggests that the Rule be expanded to avoid
jury confusion by providing, for example,
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that the lawyer who will be a witness have
no other role in the courtroom than that as a
witness.
Other Rules of Advocacy
There are two other provisions in the
Model Rules on the role of the lawyer as
advocate that deserve mention because they
would change the Code, although they are
not as controversial as those discussed
above.
First, Rule 3.3 deals more aggressively
with the issue of delay than does the Code.
Not only are frivolous motions for purposes
of delay improper, but the Rule provides
that every lawyer has an affirmative obligation to expedite litigation. Delay simply to
further the financial interest of a client "is
not a legitimate interest of the client" which
a lawyer should try to seek. While this may
be only a change in emphasis, the strong
statement against improper delay is welcomed by the Subcommittee.
A second change that seems sensible to
the Subcomittee is an expanded obligation
on the part of counsel to inform the court of
pertinent legal authorities. The Code in DR
7-106(B)(1) obligates lawyers to inform the
court only of "directly adverse" legal authority in "the controlling jurisdiction. "
Model Rule 3.1(c) broadens that obligation
by requiring lawyers to inform the court of
any legal authority "known to the lawyer
that would probably have a substantial effect
on the determination of a material issue. "
The following principle underlies this Rule:
Legal argument is a discussion among
the advocates and the tribunal, seeking
to determine the legal premises properly applicable to the case. The extent
of disclosure is at times a matter of
judgment. An advocate is not required
to present the full array of opposing
authority. Where the lawyer knows of
authority that the court clearly ought to
consider, the court should be advised of
its existence if the opposing party has
not done so.s
By the same token, baseless or frivolous
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legal argument is not condoned because it
would be in fact misleading. The Model
Rule eliminates the ambiguity of "directly
adverse" legal authority and the questionable criterion of "the controlling jurisdiction" as now provided in the Code. In the
Subcommittee's judgment, this provision is
an improvement over the Code.
Although the Subcommittee finds the
Rules to be some improvement over the
Code, their reaction to the section on the role
of the advocate is, on balance, severely negative. The Subcommittee feels that the complete reversal from the Code on the disclosure of a client's false testimony would injure severely the confidential relationship
between the lawyer and the client. The Subcommittee is also very troubled by Rule
3.1(e), which seems to suggest that lawyers
ought to disclose adverse evidence. Even if
rules such as these would produce "the
whole truth," the Subcommittee feels that
the sacrifice of an important premiseconfidentiality in the lawyer-client
relationship-is too high a price.
THE LAWYER AS NEGOTIATOR
Section 4 of the ten sections of the Model
Rules is devoted exclusively to the role of
the lawyer as negotiator. Lawyers in all
areas of specialty spend considerable time as
negotiators. The client's cause or desires
often may be best advanced through a
negotiated settlement of civil litigation,
compromise in a business deal or plea bargaining in a criminal case. The Model Rules
mandate that a lawyer adopt a negotiating
stance that is less adversarial and more conciliatory than what appears to be permitted
under the Code.
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer would
be required to bend over backwards out of an
overabundance of fairness when functioning
as a negotiator. The Model Rules seek to
convey a new mood in negotiationslawyers must value scrupulous fairness to
opposing parties and their lawyers in negotiations over the zealous representation of
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their own clients. Whether such a concept
can be adopted in practice is uncertain.
What is certain is that the change in attitude
demanded by the Model Rules would create
new uncertainties in the negotiating context.
Negotiations Under the Code
The Code does not single out the negotiation process as a distinct subject for guidance regarding professional conduct. A
lawyer's conduct during negotiations on behalf of a client is governed by the general
maxims and precepts of the Code.
Canon 7 of the Code requires that "A
Lawyer Should Represent A Client Zealously Within The Bounds Of The Law."
DR 7-102 requires, among other things, that
a lawyer shall not engage in illegal or
fraudulent conduct or counsel or assist his
client to engage in such conduct. That Disciplinary Rule also provides that if a lawyer
learns that his client has perpetrated a fraud
upon a person, the lawyer shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person, except when
the information constitutes a privileged
communication.
DR 7-104 requires that lawyers not communicate with an opposing party known to
be represented by a lawyer, unless the inquiring lawyer has the prior consent of the
lawyer representing such other party, or is
authorized by law to do so. Also, EC 7-10
states:
The duty of a lawyer to represent his
client with zeal does not militate against
his concurrent obligation to treat with
consideration all persons involved in
the legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless harm.
In sum, these provisions of the Code provide
little guidance to a practicing attorney as to
the obligations of professional conduct in a
negotiating context, except for a minimum
standard of fairness.
The Model Rules and Negotiations
The Model Rules change the format of
professional responsibility concepts as
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applied to negotiations by specifically
focusing on the negotiating context and the
role of the lawyer as a negotiator. The Introduction to the section of the Model Rules
which applies to the lawyer as negotiator
provides an overview and certain guidelines
which a lawyer should follow in representing a client in negotiations. Its tone is conciliatory. For example, it states, "The
lawyer should help the client appreciate the
interest and position of the other party and
should encourage concessions that will effectuate the client's larger objectives." The
Subcommittee feels that such a course of
conduct is desirable under some, but not all,
circumstances. While the intent is laudable,
the Introduction may create confusion in the
mind of any lawyer reading it as to the requirements of proper conduct in negotiations because it appears to be primarily aspirational and provides little concrete guidance.
Disclosures to a Client
The first requirement in the Model Rules
when a lawyer conducts negotiations on behalf of a client is that the lawyer must inform
the client of relevant facts and communications from the other side, including offers.6
This is consistent with EC 7-7 of the Code,
and appears to be duplicative of Rule 1.4 of
the Model Rules which requires "Adequate
Communications" in all lawyer-client relations. The Subcommittee has no objection to
elevating to a mandatory rule the requirement that a lawyer inform his client fully of
the material aspects of any negotiations. In
effect, this Model Rules changes an aspirational statement in the Code to a duty when a
lawyer negotiates on behalf of a client.
Fairness to Other Participants
Rule 4.2 of the Model Rules requires a
lawyer to deal fairly with other participants
in negotiations, avoid sham negotiation and
otherwise avoid legal and ethical improprieties. For the most part, Rule 4.2 is a
paraphrase of DR 7-102 and DR 7-104. One
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significant change, however, is paragraph
(b) of Rule 4.2, which, among other things,
provides:
A lawyer shall not .

. .

fail to disclose

a material fact known to the lawyer,
even if adverse, when disclosure
is . . . necessary to correct a manifest

misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a previous representation
made by the lawyer or known by the
lawyer to have been made by the
client. . . .
This requirement appears to differ from
the Code because, under Rule 4.2, a lawyer
must disclose in negotiations adverse facts
where the other side misapprehended a previous representation, even where the previous representation constituted full and honest disclosure by the lawyer or the lawyer's
client. Thus, under Rule 4.2, a lawyer has
an obligation to rectify unilateral mistakes
about facts or law made by other parties or
their counsel, even in the absence of fraud or
negligence by the lawyer and his or her
client.
The Subcommittee is divided as to
whether a lawyer should be required to correct unilateral mistakes made by opposing
counsel or other negotiating adversaries.
Aside from not understanding the contours
of the requirement, some members of the
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Subcommittee believe that in a negotiating
context lawyers have no obligation to protect opposing parties and their counsel from
their own self-created errors. On the other
hand, the Subcommittee recognizes that
disclosures as required pursuant to Rule
4.2(b) may foster attainment of a client's
objectives in the long run and therefore the
requirement has merit.
In any event, the Subcommittee is in
unanimous agreement that in the context of
litigation, particularly during settlement
discussions after the commencement of
trial, this disclosure obligation of Rule
4.2(b) should not apply because of the overlapping obligations of a lawyer as an advocate and as a negotiator. Thus, for example,
if the lawyer representing a party in litigation negotiates a settlement with opposing
counsel who is negotiating under the erroneous premise that the testimony of a witness at trial was complete and accurate, the
lawyer should not be required to correct that
erroneous impression of opposing counsel,
The Subcommittee on the whole is wary
of the thrust of Rule 4.2, which is entitled
"Fairness to Other Participants." Lawyers
should not have any affirmative obligation
to be "fair" with those persons on the other
side of the negotiating table because the
term "fairness" is fraught with ambiguity.
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It is believed, however, that lawyers should
THE LAWYER AS INTERMEDIARY
be honest and not mislead adversaries.
Should a lawyer be allowed to act as an
Thus, the Subcommittee thinks that both in
intermediary
between two clients whose intitle and substance Rule 4.2 should be
changed to "Honesty to Other Partici- terests differ? Are there circumstances in
which a lawyer may perform a valuable pubpants. "
lic service by attempting to complete a
transaction or resolve a minor dispute
Illegal, Fraudulent or Unconscionable
among several clients?
Transactions
It is axiomatic that it is in the interest of
Rule 4.3 prohibits a lawyer from concludthe
legal profession to attempt to find ways
ing an agreement, or assisting a client in
to
provide
legal services at lower costs. 7 A
concluding an agreement, that would be illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable. It is con- lawyer who represents two different clients
sistent with DR 7-102(A)(7) and DR who become involved in the same transac7-102(A)(8), which prohibit a lawyer from tion would probably be able to represent
counseling or assisting a client in conduct both clients more economically than if two
that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudu- or more lawyers were needed to handle the
lent, or knowingly engaging in illegal con- same transaction. However, the approduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary priateness of a lawyer acting as an interRule. Rule 4.3 is actually narrower than the mediary between two clients continues to be
Code in that the Rule applies only to the end the subject of considerable debate.
result of negotiations, mainly concluding an
agreement, rather than to improper conduct The Present Code and Multiple
occurring during the course of negotiations. Representation
The Code prohibits representation of mulHowever, Rule 4.3, in conjunction with
tiple
clients if the interests of the clients
Rule 4.2, covers the entire scope of the
differ,
whether such interests be conflicting,
negotiation process including its formal
inconsistent,
diverse or otherwise discorconsumation. The Subcommittee thus has
dant
and
if
employment
by one client will
no objection to the adoption of this Rule.
adversely affect the lawyer's judgment on
behalf of or dilute his loyalty to the other
Conclusion as to New Negotiator Rules
client or clients. A lawyer may represent
The Model Rules as they apply to negotia- multiple clients if each is fully informed of
tions for the most part are edifying and use- the potential conflict of interests, if each conful. Those Rules seek to minimize comba- sents to the multiple representation, and if
tiveness and emphasize candor. In an overly the interests do not become actually differlitigious society, such an attitude is a virtu- ing.8 Of course, if a serious conflict deous sentiment. However, in a code of pro- velops, then a lawyer will probably have to
fessional conduct, any disclosure require- withdraw from representing any of the
ment to the extent that it requires correcting clients.
an adversary's unilateral mistakes compromises a lawyer's effectiveness and obli- The Definition of a New Role
gations as an advocate. Indeed, under the The Model Rules attempt to change these
Model Rules, a client sometimes may be concepts and to provide guidelines for a
better off strategically by undertaking lawyer acting as an "intermediary" benegotiations himself, rather than through a tween two or more clients.
lawyer. The client would not be bound by
The numerous conditions which must be
rules of "fairness" which might undercut met before a lawyer can properly act as
some of the effectiveness of the lawyer as a intermediary are best explained by quoting
negotiator.
the Rule:
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5.1 Conditionsfor Acting as an Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients if:
(1) The possibility of adjusting the
clients' interests is strong; and
(2) Each client will be able to
make adequately informed decisions in the matter, and there is
little likelihood that any of the
clients will be significantly prejudiced if the contemplated adjustment of interests is unsuccessful;
and
(3) The lawyer can act impartially
and without improper effect on
other services the lawyer is performing for any of the clients; and
(4) The lawyer fully explains to
each client the implications of the
common representation, including
the advantages and risks involved,
and obtains each client's consent to
the common representation.
(b) While serving as intermediary a
lawyer shall explain fully to each
client the decisions to be made and
the considerations relevant to making them, so that each client can
make adequately informed decisions.
The lawyer role of the intermediary under
the Model Rule should be assumed only
after full disclosure and informed consent by
the clients. The clients must understand that
the lawyer could not act as an advocate or
negotiator in the traditional sense.
Rule 5.2 of the Model Rules governs
withdrawal as an intermediary. It requires
that a lawyer withdraw if either client so
requests, if any of the conditions set forth in
Rule 5.1 quoted above cannot be met, or if it
becomes apparent that a mutually advantageous adjustment of interests cannot be
made. The Rule then states that a lawyer
may continue to represent any of the clients
only to the extent compatible with his or her
responsibilities to the other client or clients.
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Subcommittee's Conclusion-A Split
Decision
The Subcommittee believes that although
there are potential advantages to clients
when a lawyer serves as intermediary, if the
differences between the clients deepen, as
often happens in negotiations or other attempts at dispute resolution, the lawyer not
only will be unable to continue to function as
an intermediary for the clients, but will
likely have to withdraw from representing
any of the parties. This may result in additional costs to the clients and embarrassment
and recrimination for the lawyer.
Problems of confidentiality and
attorney-client privilege are significant
when a lawyer acts as an intermediary.
Maintaining adequate communication with
each client as required by other Rules while
protecting client confidences would require
a delicate balance in that relationship. If
such balance cannot be maintained, the
common representation is improper. Furthermore, it must be assumed that in the event
of litigation between the clients, none of the
lawyer's communications or the communications between the clients would be protected by the lawyer-client confidence
privilege.
The Subcommittee is evenly divided ori
the intermediary rule. Some of the members
conclude that there are special, limited circumstances in which an attorney may perform a real service for existing clients, at a
lower cost to them, by acting as intermediary while still representing each party
and performing all the tasks required of an
attorney in such a representative capacity.
Other members of the Subcommittee recognize the social desirability of economy in
the rendition of legal services but feel that
the occasions on which a lawyer could successfully act as an intermediary are likely to
be very few. Moreover, it is thought that, as
a practical matter, it is impossible to represent one client in matters involving another
client without compromising the interests of
one of the clients.
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This division within the Subcommittee
indicates that the specification of the lawyer
role of intermediary and the rules of professional conduct incident to that role are matters which will require further analysis and
discussion. Since the enumeration of the
intermediary role is a new concept, time and
study will be needed to digest its consequences. As proposed in the Model Rules,
the lawyer role of intermediary does not fit
within the traditional idea of the advocate.
CONCLUSION
Without question, the proposed Model
Rules which deal with the roles of the lawyer
as advocate, negotiator and intermediary
raise some of the more complex and controversial issues in the work of the Kutak
Commission. Tradition is being questioned
in the light of the needs for truth and justice
and the rendition of effective legal services
in contemporary society. Concepts long
deemed fundamental to the assurance that
the legal system will be just are under attack.
Without doubt, the issues raised in these
several proposed Rules touch and question
what many lawyers deem to be the very
essence of the nature and purpose of the
legal profession in the United States.
Regardless of the outcome of the debate
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on these issues, that debate will help to
clarify for lawyers the fundamental principles which guide them in being professionally responsible. As a result, the limits, if
any, upon the role of the lawyer as an advocate as well as the guidelines for professional conduct by lawyers in nonadvocacy
roles will be, or can be, made clearer.
The role of the lawyer in a corporate or
governmental organization poses special
problems in modern times. The next Symposium article deals with the way in which
the Model Rules address these problems.
NOTES
1. 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. (1975), p. 1031.
2. See, ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion No.
341, Sept. 30, 1975.
3. ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, Model Rules ofProfessional
Conduct (Jan. 30, 1980), Rule 1.8.
4. Id., Comment, Rule 3.9.
5. Id., Comment, Rule 3.1.
6. Id., Rule 4.1.
7. ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards, Code of ProfessionalResponsibility (1969), Canon 2; EC 2-1.
8. Id., DR 5-105(C); see also, EC 5-20 (the
lawyer acting as an impartial arbitrator or
mediator).
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